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To what extent does the law of armed conflict (LOAC)' apply to the
United States military fighting in armed conflicts? Though the question
seems straightforward enough, the answer is anything but. This article
explains, in general, why the answer is imprecise and unsatisfying as applied
to the most prevalent type of contemporary armed conflict, non-
international.2  More specifically, this article argues that the U.S.
government's primary response of claiming to apply LOAC as a matter of
policy when and where that law wouldn't otherwise apply is superficially
persuasive but not substantively responsive.
The United States has been engaged in armed conflict since at least the
al Qaeda terrorist network attacks of September 11, 200 1.3 The initial armed
conflict was between the United States and Taliban controlled Afghanistan,
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1. The law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law, refers to "the
rules governing the actual conduct of armed conduct (jus in bello) and not to the rules governing
the resort to armed conflict (jus ad bellum)." ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1 (3d ed. 2000).
2. There are two categories of armed conflict, international (IAC) and non-international
(NIAC). As discussed infra, the vast majority of the law of armed conflict or LOAC applies to IAC,
yet NIACs are far more prevalent. Thus the kind of armed conflicts which most often occur have
the least of applicable LOAC.
3. Arguments that an armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda existed prior to
9/11 are outside the scope of this article.
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where al Qaeda was then operating.' With a country, in international law
terms, a state, on either side of the armed conflict, the result was an
international armed conflict (IAC).5 The existence of an IAC triggers the
largest amount of the LOAC applicable as a matter of law.' The LOAC
applicable to and in an IAC as a matter of law includes all four of the 1949
Geneva Conventions' (totaling over 200 pages) and a series of eighteen
Hague Conventions from 1899 and 1907.8 In short, IACs trigger the
application of the largest amount of the LOAC.
But the IAC in Afghanistan ended in late 2001 when a new, anti-Taliban,
interim Afghan government assumed control of the country.' Of course the
fighting didn't stop, the Taliban merely dispersed from cities to rural and
remote sections of Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.'o But the
characterization of the armed conflict changed, and with it, the applicable
LOAC.
Beginning in 2002 and continuing until today, the U.S. and other
countries, are allied with the government of Afghanistan in fighting the
Taliban and associated forces." This conflict, pitting a number of states
against non-state actors is, by definition, a non-international armed conflict
4. See generally Bruno Greg, U.S. War in Afghanistan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Jan. 2017), http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018.
5. See ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM "ARMED CONFLICT" DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2008).
6. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (stating that "the present convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more high contracting
parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.") [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]. And of course both the U.S. and Afghanistan, like every country in the world, have
either signed and ratified or acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
7. The 1949 Geneva Conventions deal with the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field
(GC I). See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (wounded, sick and shipwrecked
members of the armed forces at sea); see Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (prisoners of war); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 (protection of
civilians). International armed conflict also triggers the application of additional protocol I (AP I)
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions for those states which have agreed to be bound by it. In the case
of the U.S. and Afghanistan in 2001, neither were states parties to AP I.
8. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
9. See Jens David Ohlin, The Nature and Scope of the War in Afghanistan, OPINIO JURIS
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or NIAC.12 There is very little LOAC that applies as a matter of law to all
NIACs - but one article of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which deals with
armed conflict "not of an international character."l 3  And while those
provisions (known as common article three), in requiring humane treatment
of vulnerable persons, are significant, they comprise but one article.14
Thus when an armed conflict transitions from international to non-
international, a legal lacuna or gap is created. There are essentially three
possible responses when confronting this gap: (1) do nothing; (2) apply
customary international law (CIL);15 and/or (3) apply the more robust law
governing IACs as a matter of policy. This article explores these options as
applied to the United States, focusing on option 3, the U.S. application of
IAC law to NIACs as a matter of policy.
Applying LOAC as a matter of policy when that law would otherwise be
inapplicable appears to be largely how the U.S. has answered the question
asked at the outset. But what the answer is, which specific LOAC provisions
the U.S. is applying, remains elusive, both to external observers and worse,
to the members of the U.S. armed forces fighting in the armed conflicts. And
this is despite, indeed illustrated by, numerous statements by different parts
of the executive branch, under different Presidents, about applying LOAC as
a matter of policy.
For example, John Bellinger, the former legal adviser at the Department
of State (DOS) during the Bush Administration, claimed that the U.S.
"draw[s] from the laws of war" for guidance.16 His successor as DOS legal
12. Regardless of how many states are on one side, if they are not opposed by another state
the armed conflict is a NIAC. See generally SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (2012).
13. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Additional
Protocol II (AP II) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies to NIACs, but only binds states parties.
The comparison between the size of AP I, which applies to IAC, and AP II, which applies to NIAC,
is striking. AP I is some 82 pages long; AP II is 10 pages. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
14. Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is known as Common Article Three as it is the
same in all four of the 1949 Conventions. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional
Protocols, ICRC (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-
law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm. Common Article 3 requires that those
no longer actively participating in hostilities, the wounded and the sick be humanely treated and
cared for. Id. The article also prohibits cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and torture. Id.
15. Customary international law consists "of rules that come from a general practice accepted
as law and exist independent of treaty law." Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC
(Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-intemational-humanitarian-law-0.
16. John L. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Legal Issues in the War on




advisor, Harold Koh, acknowledged that "international law informs the scope
of our detention authority."l7 In similar fashion, the Department of Justice
(DoJ) claims to "draw on the international laws of war."" And that
"[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority
Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict."" President Obama
has even joined the effort. In 2011, he issued an Executive Order on
reviewing detention of individuals at Guantanamo Bay that defines law of
war detention as "detention authorized by Congress under the AUMF, as
informed by the laws of war." 20
More recently, President Obama issued an Executive Order, 2 1 and a
Report 22 , describing U.S. policies as "consistent with the law of armed
conflict."
Drawing from, being informed by, and acting consistent with LOAC
suggests a tangible connection to a body of law while actually saying nothing
that binds or obligates the U.S government. Such statements are little more
than verbal obfuscation. What does it mean to draw from or be informed by
something in general, let alone when that something, here the LOAC, is itself
unspecified?
Obviously the portion of the U.S. government most directly involved in
and impacted by armed conflict is the Department of Defense (DoD). And
the DoD has not only made similar, nebulous, statements concerning the
policy application of LOAC, it has done so in a longer and more formal (and
presumably more reflective) manner than the quotes listed above. 23 These
17. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Speech at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law
(March 25, 2010) https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179305.pdf.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PROGRESS REPORT APRIL 2009 (2009).
19. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative
to Detainees held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No.
08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
20. Exec. Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277, 13280 (Mar. 7, 2011). Similarly, after U.S.
special operations forces killed Osama Bin Laden, the White House Press Secretary stated "[t]he
operation was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war." Press Briefing by
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney (May 4, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2011/05/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-54201 1.
21. See Exec. Order No. 13732, 81 Fed. Reg. 44483, 44486 (July 1, 2016).
22. See THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING
THE UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
(2016).
23. See generally DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01 E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (2006)
[hereinafter DoD Directive]; see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL (2015) [hereinafter DoD Manual].
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statements, contained in a DoD Directive on its Law of War Program 24 and
the recently released DoD Law of War Manual,25 are discussed infra.2 6
There is political utility in the U.S. government's issuing self-laudatory
statements about applying more law than the law itself requires. The U.S.
government receives the benefits of being able to argue its applying more law
than technically necessary and the positive perceptions such largess
engenders. At the same time, the U.S. government does not incur much if
any costs from statements which sound substantive but which are so vague
as to be unverifiable and thus unassailable. But there are real, if hidden, costs
that flow from that practice and the U.S. foregoing the opportunity to
demonstrate how it generates respect for LOAC through its application as a
matter of policy. 27
In order to provide context to evaluate those costs, Part I of this article
fleshes out the unhelpful, inverse nature of armed conflict frequency and
applicable law. Having established the resulting legal gap, Part II then
reviews the possible manners by which the U.S. could respond, by doing
nothing, applying CIL, or by applying IAC law as a matter of policy to
NIACs. Part II focuses on DoD's policy approach, exploring first the DoD
Directive and then the Law of War Manual. Part III then explains the
opportunity cost of the current U.S. approach of vague policy application of
the LOAC. Part III first discuses the practical costs of degraded operational
effectiveness and then highlights the moral or strategic cost through reference
to prior U.S. practice whereby DoD meaningfully applied law as a matter of
policy after the Korean and during the Vietnam wars. The article concludes
with a call that DoD return to these prior policy positions and specify the
LOAC it is applying as a matter of policy.
I. LAW AS A FUNCTION OF TYPE OF ARMED CONFLICT
The United States has been engaged in armed conflict for more than
fifteen years, fighting in Afghanistan since 200128 and for over a decade in
24. DoD Directive, supra note 23.
25. DoD Manual, supra note 23.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See Contemporary Challenges to IHL - Respect for IHL: Overview, ICRC (Nov. 29,
2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/respect-ibl/
overview-respect-for-ihl.htm (describing the obligation of all states parties to the Geneva
Convention, including the U.S., as having to both respect and ensure respect for the Conventions
per article 1).




Iraq.29 The international nature of these conflicts was short lived, as the U.S.
and its coalition partners toppled Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in roughly
twelve weeks and Saddam Hussein's Iraq in less than six.30
Armed conflict most certainly continued, but in a non-international
form-the U.S. and other countries partnered with the new interim
governments of Afghanistan and Iraq to fight insurgencies comprised of non-
state actors. 1 These conflicts were (and remain) NIACs.3 2 But as described
above, the change of conflict status from IAC to NIAC meant that with the
exception of Common Article Three, none of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
were legally operable.
The paucity of law applicable to NIACs created a profound regulatory
gap. This problem is exacerbated because NIACs occur far more frequently
than IACs.33 Indeed estimates are that over the past 50 years, over 90% of
the armed conflicts have been NIACs.34
Realistically, there are three possible responses to the dearth of LOAC
applicable in NIAC as a matter of law: (1) do nothing, (2) apply customary
international law (CIL), or (3) apply IAC law as a matter of policy.35
II. RESPONSE OPTIONS TO THE LACK OF LOAC APPLICABLE IN NIAC
A. Do Nothing
After the IAC portion of the U.S. armed conflicts in Afghanistan, and
later Iraq, transitioned to NIAC, the U.S. confronted the challenge resulting
from the precipitous drop off in LOAC applicable as a matter of law in a
unique way. The U.S. argued that not even the limited amount of NIAC law,
29. War in Iraq Begins, HISTORY.COM (2009), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/war-in-iraq-begins; see also Jesse Singal et al., Seven Years in Iraq: An Iraq War Timeline,
TIME (Mar. 19, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/0,28757,1967340,00.html.
The U.S. military presence and role in Iraq has surged, ended, and is currently increasing. As of
this writing in 2017, the U.S. has returned approximately 5000 troops to Iraq to advise and assist
Iraq in its fight against ISIS. See Christopher Woolf, A Confrontation with Iran Could be Deadly
for American Troops in Iraq, PRI (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-02/us-
confrontation-iran-could-be-deadly-american-troops-iraq.
30. The War in Afghanistan: A Timeline, supra note 28. The discussion of global or
transnational NIAC is not germane to this essay.
31. Ohlin, supra note 9.
32. Id.
33. ERIK MELANDER, ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD 2015: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE
UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM 3 (2015).
34. Id.
35. The role of human rights law during armed conflict is outside the scope of this article.
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namely Common Article Three, applied.3 6 In essence the U.S. government
argued for less law.37
The U.S. advanced this argument in litigation involving Osama Bin
Laden's former driver, Salim Hamdan. 38 Afghan forces captured Hamdan in
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and turned him over to the U.S., which then
transported Hamdan to Guantanamo.3 9 At issue in the litigation was whether
or not the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 precluded Hamdan's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. federal court.40 Through the petition, Hamdan
challenged the authority of a U.S. military commission to prosecute him for
conspiracy and providing material support for terrorism. 41
As part of its argument, the U.S. government claimed that no portion of
the Geneva Conventions applied as a matter of law to the armed conflict in
Afghanistan against al Qaeda.42 There were both reasonable and
unreasonable aspects to this claim. The reasonable portion of the argument
was that the armed conflict with al Qaeda could not be an IAC because al
Qaeda is not a state nor a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions.43
As a result, the only portion of the Geneva Conventions which could
potentially apply as a matter of law was Common Article Three.4 4 Where the
government's argument became unreasonable was in contending that not
even Common Article Three applied.4 5
36. THE WHITE HOUSE, HUMANE TREATMENT OF AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES
(2002) [hereinafter White House memo] (claiming that neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions
governing IAC nor Common Article 3 governing NIAC were applicable in the U.S.'s armed conflict
against al Qaeda and the Taliban).
37. Id. President Bush signed a memo which essentially claimed no LOAC applied less than
a month after the U.S. began transporting detainees to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. What followed were a series of memorandums by various U.S. government officials
authorizing enhanced interrogation techniques and are now referred to as the "Torture Memos."
One reason the U.S. government was interested in no LOAC applying was that as previously
discussed, the LOAC contains prohibitions against cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, as
well as torture. While arguments can be made about some enhanced interrogation techniques not
qualifying as CIDT, it's beyond reasonable debate that certain techniques, notably waterboarding,
most certainly did qualify. See A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/intemational/24MEMO-GUIDE.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
38. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 (2006).
39. Idat 566.
40. Id. at 572.
41. Hamdan filed his petition prior to the DTA's enactment. Id. at 572; see also Hamdan
Charge Sheet, http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/Hamdan/Hamdan%20(AE001).pdf.
42. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628
43. Id. at 629.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 630.
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The government attempted to rigidly construe the scope of application
of Common Article Three.46 The article begins with "[i]n the case of armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties."4 7 While acknowledging the existence of an
armed conflict not of an international character between the U.S. and al
Qaeda, the U.S. claimed the conflict was not in the territory of one of the high
contracting parties as specified.48 Rather, the conflict was in the territory of
several high contracting parties, at a minimum Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Yemen.4 9 Under this approach, not even Common Article Three would
apply.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the U.S. government, ruling that
Common Article Three applied to the U.S. when involved in any NIAC.so
While the Hamdan case is important, the result was merely a return to the
status quo ante of the legal gap, that when a conflict transitions from an IAC
to a NIAC, the only LOAC which applies as a matter of law is Common
Article Three." Obviously the do nothing or, really, argue for less LOAC
was not aimed at filling the gap. Employing customary international law
could fill the gap, though the U.S. has not meaningfully employed this
approach.
B. Customary International Law
One way to supplement NIAC law is by utilizing customary international
law or CIL. The Statute of the International Court of Justice describes
customary international law as "a general practice accepted as law."52 The
existence of CIL "requires the presence of two elements, namely State
practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is required, prohibited or
allowed, depending on the nature of the rule, as a matter of law (opinio juris
sive necessitates)."5 3
As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains, CIL
"is of crucial important in today's armed conflicts because it fills gaps left by
46. Id.
47. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
48. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629-30.
49. Id. at 684.
50. Id. at 631.
51. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
52. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(b).
53. Assessment of Customary International Law, ICRC, https:/ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/virul_inasofcuin#Fn_16_10. As the ICRC notes, "[t]he exact meaning
of these two elements has been the subject of much academic writing." Id.
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treaty law in both international and non-international conflicts and so
strengthens the protection offered to victims."5 4
While all countries acknowledge CIL's existence, beyond a limited
number of preemptory norms" there are varied understandings of what rules
are or are not considered CIL.16 This is unfortunate, as according to some
estimates, 86% of IAC law may well be considered as CIL and thus
applicable to NIAC on that basis.
Countries, including the U.S., have not felt the need to detail what rules
they consider as CIL. 8 And when the ICRC issued a study of what rules
might properly be considered CIL, the U.S. disagreed with the ICRC's
methodology while still not disclosing what the U.S. considers CIL.
Against the backdrop of minimal LOAC applying to NIACs as a matter
of law and the minimal utility the U.S. has made of the other options, a
discussion on filling the legal gap as a matter of policy may be properly
undertaken.
54. Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/overview-
customary-law.htm.
55. See Erika De Wet, Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 543 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013) (Jus Cogens norms include genocide, slavery,
crimes against humanity, torture, piracy and racial discrimination).
56. Id. at 547.
57. See Emily Crawford, Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the
Distinction Between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
441, 457 (2007).
58. The U.S. is not just coy about what it considers CIL, it's contradictory. In 1987, the
Deputy Legal Adviser at the Department of State claimed that the U.S. considered Article 75 of
Additional Protocol One as CIL. See Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Detention Operations: A Strategic
View, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 275, 281 (Geoffrey Corn et al.
eds., 2015). "This position was refuted during the early years of the War on Terror but later quasi-
reinstated in 201 1." Id.
59. John B. Bellinger & Jim J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International
Committee ofthe Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 443, 444 (2007).
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C. Department ofDefense Policy
1. DoD Directive on the Law of War Program
In 2006, DoD issued a directive to "update the policies and
responsibilities ensuring DoD compliance with the law of war obligations of
the United States."o6 The directive defined the law of war as:
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.
It is often called the "law of armed conflict." The law of war encompasses
all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United
States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary
international law.61
The directive then announced that it is DoD policy that "[m]embers of
the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts,
however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military
operations."62
Given the definition of the law of war, the application of the policy
means that when the U.S. military is engaged in a NIAC the U.S. military
will comply with the more robust law governing IAC as well as CIL. Such a
policy is, or could be, profoundly significant. The United States military, as
matter of policy, would be applying both black letter law and CIL which
govern IAC, to a NIAC. Simply put, the U.S. would be applying more law
than required.
The 2006 version revised and reissued the directive which had been
previously published in 1998.64 The 1998 and 2006 memos share an identical
definition of the law of war. 65 However, the 1998 memo policy was much
more limited in scope, announcing only that "the law of war obligations of
the United States are observed and enforced by the DoD Components." 6 6
Such language is superfluous as what it means is the U.S. is bound by that
60. DOD Directive, supra note 23, ¶ 1.1.
61. Id. T 3.1.
62. Id. T 4.1.
63. A contrary reading of the directive might conclude otherwise, that in applying "applicable"
customary international law, the Directive means that which is customary law in IAC would apply
in IAC and that which is customary law in NIAC would apply in NIAC. This reading is
unpersuasive as it requires parsing IAC from NIAC when the directive states that the law of armed
conflict as defined by the directive applies however the conflict is characterized.
64. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (1998) [hereinafter
1998 Directive]. The 1998 version revised the 1979 version of the DoD's Law of War Program
directive. Id. at 1.
65. Compare 1998 Directive, supra note 64, ¶ 3.1, with DOD Directive, supra note 23, ¶ 3.1.
66. 1998 Directive, supra note 64, T4.1.
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law to which it has agreed to be bound.6 7 This is, of course, the case
regardless of a policy memo.68 Under this policy the U.S. would apply no
more, or less, law than is required. Thus IAC rules control in IAC and NIAC
rules, aka Common Article Three, controls in NIAC, but there would be no
legal co-mingling.
Thus the DoD modified the directive governing its law of war program
between 1998 and 2006 in a way that suggests an expansive increase in the
LOAC applicable to all members of the DoD in all military operations.69 But
for the directive to actually yield that result, one would have to know what
specific portions of the LOAC are included. Similarly, without knowing
what rules the DoD or the U.S. government claim are CL, instructing DoD
members to comply with CIL is essentially devoid of meaning. While that
amorphous status quo continues to this day, the DoD had an opportunity to
clarify its policy position in the DoD Law of War Manual.
2. DoD Law of War Manual
In 2015, after controversial delays,70 the DoD issued the long awaited
Law of War Manual [DoD manual]." The manual is a 1200 page policy
document whose purpose was to "provide information on the law of war to
DoD personnel responsible for implementing the law of war and executing
military operations."7 2 Unfortunately, the manual fails to achieve its stated
purpose and nowhere more so than in the area of clarifying what LOAC
applies as a matter of policy in a NIAC.
The LOAC governing detention in IAC is well developed and there is
considerable state practice. The Third Geneva Convention74 is devoted to
prisoners of war and a significant portion of the Fourth Convention 5 explains
when and how countries may inter civilians during armed conflict. Yet the
67. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law, 118
YALE L.J. 1762, 1813 (2009).
68. 1998 Directive, supra note 64, ¶ 4.1.
69. DoD Directive, supra note 23.
70. W. Hays Parks, Update on the DoD Law of War Manual, remarks delivered to the ABA
22nd Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law (Nov. 30, 2012), https://lawfare.s3-us-
west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2012/12/Parks.Manual.pdf.
71. See generally DoD Manual, supra note 23.
72. DoD Manual, supra note 23.
73. See generally ICRC, STATES PARTY TO THE FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 19-JAN-2017 (2017).
74. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
75. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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manual needlessly includes a 132-page chapter on POWs in IAC, largely
regurgitating the Third Convention.7 6
In terms of what portions of IAC law the U.S. applies as a matter of
policy in NIAC, the manual is vague. For example, the manual states that "it
may be appropriate to apply the principles of the [Geneva Conventions], even
when the relevant provisions do not apply as a matter of law."77 Similarly
the manual claims that "in some instances it may be appropriate to implement
measures during detention of persons during non-international armed conflict
by analogy to the internment of POWs during international armed conflict or
by analogy to the internment of protected persons in occupied territory."78
Yet the manual does not clarify which specific principles or measures from
IAC apply as a matter of policy in NIAC.
Nor does the manual clarify what the 2006 directive means by its
reference to CIL. The manual acknowledges that "many of the rules
applicable to non-international armed conflict are found in customary
international law."79 Rather than list what those rules might be, even as a
matter of policy, the manual provides guidelines which "may be helpful in
assessing" the CIL applicable to NIAC.so Providing multiple interpretative
guidelines and directing the reader to assess which CIL rule may apply is not
particularly helpful, certainly not to those who conduct military operations.
And worse, reasonable military legal advisors might well apply those
guidelines differently, problematically yielding different answers as to
applicable CIL.
So why have directives and manuals which are so vague as to not provide
functionally useful information to the purported target audience? One answer
is that the lack of specificity is most certainly knowing and intended." The
vagueness preserves flexibility and proves defensibly useful-it's impossible
to critique the manner by which the U.S. has followed or complied with the
law the U.S. is applying as a matter of policy when no one knows what the
law is. But there are opportunity costs, both practical and strategic, to this
76. The manual's repetition of the Third Convention includes providing a breakdown of how
many Swiss francs different ranked POWs should receive in advance pay (despite no country ever
having implemented such an advance pay plan) and listing the antiquated requirement of access to





81. One unfortunate possibility is that the manual signals an effort by DoD to return to the
minimalist legal approach reflected in the 1998 directive whereby the U.S. applies only that
international law it has agreed to be bound by. See 1998 Directive, supra note 64. While the
minimum may be all that is legally required, it's hardly an inspiring approach.
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approach. And this is demonstrated not by comparison to some other
countries' policies, but DoD's own past policies which meaningfully applied
otherwise not applicable LOAC
III. OPPORTUNITY COST
A. Practical
One reason DoD should be seeking to be more specific about what law
it is applying as a matter of policy is that it facilitates operational
effectiveness. Simply put, the U.S. military needs to know the legal rules
under which it is operating. When that is known, the military plans and
executes missions accordingly. When it is unknown or ambiguous, there is
hesitancy and delays in the conduct of operations. And in the absence of
clear guidance, there is a real risk that different units will reach different
conclusions as to the operable legal constraints, yielding unacceptable
disparity and lack of uniformity within the same area of operations.
For example, in the area of detention, the U.S. military is extremely well
versed in how to establish and operate facilities for both prisoners of war
under the Third Geneva Convention and civilian internees under the Fourth
Geneva Convention. One would think that DoD would effectuate policy
decisions which play to the military's strengths. Meaningfully applying the
Geneva Conventions as a matter of policy can do just that, it makes operable
a large body of law with which the U.S. military is very familiar. But doing
so without detailing which portions of the Geneva Conventions are applicable
is functionally useless to and for the military. And while the opportunity cost
in practical terms of not detailing the policy application of LOAC is
significant, the cost in strategic terms may be even greater.
B. Strategic
To fully appreciate the opportunity costs of the U.S.'s current approach,
it is important to consider previous instances where, unlike today, DoD
meaningfully applied otherwise inapplicable LOAC as a matter of policy.
After the Korean82 and during the Vietnam wars,83 DoD issued policy
82. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956)
[hereinafter FM 27-10].
83. See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT 232 (2013) (discussing Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directive 381-11).
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guidance that belligerents not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status would
nonetheless be entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions. 84
These policies enabled the U.S. military to apply the more robust body
of IAC of which it was more knowledgeable and experienced, the 1949
Geneva Conventions. And in the process, the U.S., in applying law it need
not under the letter of that law, firmly occupied moral high ground, ground it
seems determined to cede. Both of those positives outcomes are eroded if
not eliminated by the current practice of announcing the application of LOAC
as a matter of policy but never detailing to which portions of LOAC law the
policy applies.
For example, the Army's Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare first
published in 1956, stated that "those protected by [Fourth Geneva
Convention] also include all persons who have engaged in hostile or
belligerent conduct but who are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of
war. "85 What that statement means is that someone who, as a matter of law,
did not qualify as a POW would be considered a civilian and receive the
protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also means being interned
as a security threat under the terms of that same convention. 86 This is more
than the Fourth Geneva Convention requires."
84. In contrast, of course is President Bush's 2002 memorandum claiming that none of the
Geneva Conventions applied to an armed conflict against al Qaeda. See White House Memo, supra
note 36. As then Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned the President, the memo would "reverse
over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the
protections of the laws of war for our troops." COLIN L. POWELL, DRAFT DECISION MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE CONFLICT IN
AFGHANISTAN 2 (2002).
85. FM 27-10, supra note 82, T 247.
86. Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Indefinite Under the Laws of War, 22 STAN. L & POL.
REV. 41 (2011) (describing the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention internment and review
procedures).
87. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, where an individual who does not qualify for POW
status engages in activities hostile to the security of the State, "such individual person shall not be
entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the [Fourth Geneva Convention) as would, if
exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State."
Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 75,
6 U.S.T. at 3520, 3522, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290, 292. This means that the capturing State is not legally
required to afford such individuals the full rights and privileges of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Article 5 does require that such persons be treated with humanity, and that they be granted the full
rights and privileges "at the earliest date consistent with the security of State or occupying power."
Id. But that reinforces that the only requirement under the Fourth Convention is that a State
humanely treat civilians who engage in activities hostile to the State. By contrast, under FM 27-10,
an individual who does not qualify for POW status would be entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. FM 27-10, supra note 82, T 247.
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Absent this policy application of the Fourth Convention, the only LOAC
that would apply as a matter of law is Common Article 3."1 And as discussed
supra, the Bush Administration argued that not even Common Article Three
applied to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban." In addition to the legal
problems with this approach, it impliedly rejects FM 27-10's position that
captured unprivileged belligerents should be considered and treated as a
civilian. The purpose of FM 27-10 is "to provide authoritative guidance to
military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct
of warfare on land and to relationships between belligerents and neutral
States." 0 While it remains the Executive Branch's prerogative to establish
DoD policy, that the White House, during war time, ignored or overruled
forty-seven year old military guidance seems notable. And that the Executive
Branch, under both Presidents Bush and Obama, has not clarified the
resulting detention policy, and which parts of FM 27-10 remain valid, is
unhelpful to the very military members conducting detention operations.
The more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the first
meaningful opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate its detention policy
during armed conflict with non-state actors; the Vietnam War was. And
while not ignoring any number of legal issues associated with the conduct of
that war, the U.S. military developed a policy that provided more legal
protection to captured enemy belligerents than the Geneva Conventions
required and did so in a transparent and verifiable manner."
During the Vietnam War, the U.S., in support of South Vietnam, fought
both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), which was entitled to POW status
as a matter of law, as well as the Viet Cong and other organized groups which
were not.92 The U.S. military command, Military Assistance Command
Vietnam, issued an instruction clarifying that while the Viet Cong did not
qualify as POWs, they would be treated as such.9 3 The result was that
captured NVA were housed in a camp on one side of a road, and the Viet
Cong and other groups housed in an identical camp on the other side of the
road. The U.S. applied the Third Geneva Convention as a matter of a law in
one camp and as matter of policy in the other.
88. While providing important protections, Common Article 3 is but one article. And the point
of the article may be reduced to treating captured personnel humanely. That's of course a useful
touchstone. But it pales in comparison to the detailed guidance the Fourth Geneva Convention
provides.
89. See White House Memo, supra note 36, at 1.
90. FM 27-10, supra note 82, T 1.
91. See GEORGE PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973 at 112-117 (1975).




What was critically important was that application of the Third Geneva
Convention as a matter of policy was identical to its application as a matter
of law.94 This allowed for the ICRC to inspect U.S. compliance with an
obligation it had assumed as a matter of policy." An ICRC representative
had this to say concerning the policy implementing identical treatment
conditions:
The MACV instruction ... is a brilliant expression of a liberal and realistic
attitude. . . . This text could very well be a most important one in the history
of the humanitarian law, for it is the first time . . . that a government goes
far beyond the requirements of the Geneva Convention in an official
instruction to its armed forces. The dreams of today are the realities of
tomorrow, and the day those definitions or similar ones will become
embodied in an international treaty . .. will be a great one for man
concerned about the protection of men who cannot protect themselves....
May it then be remembered that this light first shone in the darkness of this
tragic war of Vietnam. 96
Amidst the savagery and controversy of the Vietnam War, in the area of
detainee treatment, the U.S occupied the moral high ground and was seen as
such by outside observers. 97 But in the post 9/11 armed conflict, the U.S.
abdicated that high ground by started making vague and thus unverifiable
claims of detention policies informed by, or drawing from, the LOAC.
Indeed, the current state of U.S. detention practice is such that a detainee at
Guantanamo filed suit claiming, among other things, that the U.S. was not
complying with seemingly basic provisions of the Geneva Conventions that
the U.S. claims "informs" its detention practice.98
CONCLUSION
While there are advantages which flow from making self-congratulatory
and non-specific claims of applying the LOAC, the U.S. is overlooking the
costs in compromised military effectiveness and in perceptions of legitimacy.
That the U.S. voluntarily ceded the moral high ground it staked out through
94. PRUGH, supra note 91, at 65-66.
95. This is not to say that policy applications are an all or nothing approach. The key is that
there is transparency and specific details as to what provisions are being applied as a matter of
policy.
96. PRUGH, supra note 91, at 66-67.
97. Id. at 68-69.
98. Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing Abdullah's complaint,
at least in part, as stemming from DoD's failure to comply with basic provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, including posting of the conventions in the place of confinement).
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the meaningful application of LOAC by policy for almost fifty years was
needlessly unfortunate.
Should the U.S. seek to again provide world leadership in generating
respect for LOAC by applying otherwise inapplicable law as a matter of
policy it should detail what that law is and open its practices up to outside
scrutiny. However, unless and until that point, mere statements about
policies being informed by, or drawing from, the LOAC will continue to
receive the weight and credit they deserve-none.

